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ABSTRACT

Intended to help Americans resolve distrust of the Soviet Union in view of the current wave of concern about nuclear war, this booklet addresses Soviet actions over the decades and American reactions to the U.S.S.R. Because American interpretation of Soviet power and influence is central to any discussion of working with the Soviet Union, the text deals not only with military and political realities, but also with perceptions. Chapter 1 focuses on Soviet actions that have aroused distrust, while chapters 2 and 3 examine who is "really" ahead militarily and take a realistic look at Soviet expansionism. To put the situation in perspective, chapters 4, 5, and 6 objectively discuss Soviet fears, weaknesses, and foreign policy goals. Chapter 7 compares foreign interventions by the two superpowers, applying a single standard. In the final two chapters, the common interests of the two countries are considered and the Soviet record in keeping agreements is explored. The document concludes with a general summary, suggested readings, and a list of discussion questions. (LH)

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What about the Russians?

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by Sanford Gottlieb

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Contents

Introduction	4
1. Soviet actions that aroused distrust	7
2. Who is <i>really</i> ahead?	11
3. A realistic look at Soviet expansionism	19
4. "An elephant afraid of mice"	25
5. Soviet weaknesses	29
6. Soviet foreign policy goals	33
7. Superpower conduct judged by a single standard	37
8. The superpowers' common interests	41
9. The Soviet record in keeping agreements	45
Conclusion	49
Suggested Readings	52
Questions for Discussion	54

Introduction

"We want peace, but what about the Russians?" In the current wave of concern about nuclear war, that basic question continues to worry the American public.

American distrust of the Soviet Union is a fact of life. According to a Roper poll in 1981, 69% of the public believed the Soviets seek global domination. Half of this group thought the Soviets would seek that goal *even at the risk of war*. A Washington Post/ABC News Poll in 1982 reported that six out of every seven Americans believed the Soviet Union would secretly violate a nuclear-freeze agreement, which a majority nonetheless favored.

Most Americans accept the idea that, if we are to remove the shadow that hangs over our future, we must reach arms reduction agreements with the Soviets. But how can you reach agreements with people you think are out to do you in? That quandary has troubled millions of Americans. It blocked ratification of the SALT II Treaty. It has been a stumbling block in the way of most efforts to slow or stop the Soviet-American arms race. Those who wish to work for arms reduction and the prevention of nuclear war must address this question squarely or they will lose credibility with the public.

The purpose of this booklet is to help concerned Americans resolve that problem realistically for themselves. The first three chapters address the sources of distrust: Soviet actions over the decades and American reactions to the USSR. How Americans see Soviet power and influence is central to any discussion of working with the Soviet Union. This booklet has therefore gone not only into the military and political realities, but also into perceptions.



Next, to put the picture in perspective, we look as objectively as we can at Soviet fears, weaknesses and foreign policy goals. We then compare foreign interventions by the two superpowers, applying a single standard. Finally, we consider the interests the two countries have in common—the necessary basis for any agreement—and explore the Soviet record in keeping agreements.

This is a small booklet on a big subject. We have tried to keep it short and clear, although not at the expense of accuracy and balance. Readers who are interested will find much fuller treatment of various topics in the suggested readings at the end.

The author is not an expert in Soviet affairs, but rather a concerned citizen who has twice visited the USSR—and was once denied a visa by Moscow because of support for Soviet dissidents. The sources for the information in the booklet are all in the public domain.

Specialists in Soviet affairs and arms control have generously reviewed the text in their individual capacities, although the author is solely responsible for its contents. Thanks go to the following for their thoughtful and knowledgeable comments (affiliations listed for purposes of identification only):

Alexander Dallin, Professor of History, Stanford University; Gregory Guroff, Chief of Soviet and East European Research, U.S. International Communication Agency; Jerry F. Hough, Professor of Political Science, Duke University, and Staff Member, Brookings Institution; Herbert Scoville, Jr., former Deputy Director for Research (Science and Technology), CIA, and Marshall D. Shulman, Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Relations and Director, Russian Institute, Columbia University.



Americans generally have regarded the Soviet Union with suspicion and dislike since its founding in 1917 because of its totalitarian government and state-controlled economy. The United States didn't recognize the USSR diplomatically until 1933. Feelings of friendship from fighting on the same side in World War II evaporated with the Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe. From 1945 to the present, three sustained Soviet actions have aggravated American distrust: the domination of Eastern Europe, a big military build-up, and involvement in various Third World countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The first of these actions dates from the final stages of World War II. After the Red Army had pushed back the Germans and occupied most of Eastern Europe, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin agreed at Yalta that the post-war governments in Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria would be chosen in free elections. But free elections, apart from one in Hungary, were never held. Instead, the Soviets imposed puppet regimes on the four countries and on East Germany as well. In 1948 a coup added Czechoslovakia to the Soviet camp.

These actions created a Soviet-dominated zone along the USSR's western border. The Soviets, with bitter memories of two German invasions within a generation and 20 million Soviet dead in the war just ended, saw the takeover of Eastern Europe as protection against future attacks. The West, however, saw the move as a brutal power grab and a violation of the Yalta commitment. Some feared the Soviets would sweep across Europe if they weren't stopped. The Soviet action and the West's reaction were the opening guns in the Cold War, a state of tension and hostility that has continued, with varying intensity, to the present.

Stalin and his successors, haunted by fears of attack, have pursued total security through large military forces and a network of police states under Soviet control. When the Hungarians and Czechoslovaks tried to make internal changes in 1956 and 1968, Moscow sent the Red Army to suppress them. In 1981, the Soviets used the Polish army rather than their own to impose martial law in a confrontation with Solidarity, the independent trade union. Each successive use of force to crush opposition in Eastern Europe intensified American distrust.

Military build-up

The second factor feeding distrust has been a continuing Soviet military build-up. This began in earnest after the Soviets backed down

The Soviet system may be less terrifying than it used to be, but few Americans would want to live there.

in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, a confrontation that brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. At that time the Soviet deputy foreign minister declared: "You'll never be able to do this to us again." His words were not just rhetoric. Determined to catch up with the United States, which had set the pace in the arms race from its start, the Soviets have been increasing their military spending since then by about 3% a year above the inflation rate.

As a result, the Soviet nuclear forces now rival the formidable American arsenal. Their accurate missiles can reach every corner of the United States, Europe and China. On the ground in Europe, the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies confront NATO with massive military force. Over 45 Soviet divisions face China and Japan. Their navy sails on every ocean. To Americans, this build-up appears ominous. Since Americans feel U.S. forces are purely defensive, the Soviet build-up looks very threatening.

Soviet actions in the Third World have reinforced our fear that the USSR means to dominate the entire globe. In the Vietnam conflict the Soviets along with the Chinese provided massive military aid to the

North. The Soviets equipped and ferried Cuban troops to Angola and Ethiopia, assuring the victory of a pro-Soviet faction in a civil war in Angola. They invaded Afghanistan with a Red Army force of more than 80,000. In addition, the Soviets have been selling huge quantities of arms to Third World countries, and have also provided military advisors from the USSR and Eastern bloc countries. They have used their abundance of weapons to exploit regional conflicts, as when they armed Somalis, Ethiopians and Eritrean rebels alike. Nonetheless, U.S. arms sales and training exceeded Soviet weapons deliveries in the Third World in the period 1972-81.

At home, the Soviet dictatorship continues to suppress dissent, although with less brutality and terror than in the days of Stalin. Political executions seem to have ended, and fewer Soviet citizens are sent to the dread prison camps. Moscow now prefers to exile dissidents or put them in psychiatric hospitals. The Soviet system may be less terrifying than it used to be, but few Americans would want to live there. The feelings such a system evokes in Americans reinforce their suspicions about Moscow's intentions worldwide.



If Soviet actions triggered American distrust, a later contribution to that reaction might be labeled "made in USA." Some prominent Americans have repeatedly exaggerated Soviet strengths and capabilities in a way designed to heighten American fears. They have presented as fact "worst-case" estimates of the Soviet military build-up. They have charged that the Soviets have become militarily superior and are expanding their political influence throughout the world according to a "master plan." Much of the public has come to believe these charges. As a result, many reject any agreement with the USSR as dangerous to our security. What substance is there to these charges? Let us look at the actual strength of both sides.

Judgments about military balance depend on what is placed on the scales. Those who say the balance tips in the Soviets' favor keep some things off the scales. What counts is the total capability—not just in numbers but, more important, in technological prowess—of the combined forces of each superpower and its allies in the major categories of military power. Related factors must also be considered, such as the dependability of allies and the importance of China. The balance, as we shall see, is fairly even—at levels of destructive power that defy the imagination.

Hans Bethe, a winner of the Nobel Prize in physics, a member of President Eisenhower's scientific advisory committee, and one of those who worked on the first atomic bomb, doesn't believe the Soviets are ahead. Bethe says, "We have more nuclear warheads than the Russians, and I consider this to be the most important measure of relative strength."

The reason the number of nuclear warheads is considered by
Rather, and others, the most important measure of relative strength is
that warheads determine how many separate targets can be de-
stroyed. Today, the United States has 26,000 nuclear warheads of all
sizes and types. The Soviets have 20,000. Within this huge stockpile,
the United States has over 9,000 H-bombs that can be dropped on the
USSR by land-based missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched missiles and
long-range bombers. The Soviets have over 7,000 H-bombs that can
be launched against the United States, most by land-based missiles.
Thousands of smaller nuclear weapons are deployed in Europe by both
sides. It would be difficult to find targets for all these warheads.

Those who have tried to sell us the notion of Soviet superiority
claim the United States did nothing in the 1970s while the Soviets built
up. This is false. In the seventies the United States accelerated the
Trident submarine program, developed cruise missiles, placed multi-
ple warheads on Poseidon submarine missiles, and deployed multiple-
warhead Minuteman III missiles. It was this placement of several
H-bombs in the nosecones of submarine- and ground-launched mis-
siles that permitted the United States to maintain its edge in the large
number of targets it could destroy.

Strengths cancel each other out

From the start the United States opted to place the largest share
of its warheads on relatively invulnerable submarines. This keeps its
nuclear weapons safer from attack, another vital measure of strength.
The United States also leads in long-range bombers and the new cruise
missiles, in missile accuracy, and in anti-submarine warfare. The
Soviets, however, lead in number of missiles, the lifting power of those
missiles, and the explosive power of their bombs as well as in the num-
ber of nuclear submarines. These different strengths tend to cancel
each other out.

It is important to understand why numerical superiority is really
meaningless at today's levels of destructive power. Picture what would
happen if the nuclear bombs started to go off. Each side could, if it
decided to, virtually destroy the other in an attack in which a mere frac-
tion of its nuclear weapons were used. The blast, heat, fire and radia-
tion produced by H-bombs fired only at military and industrial targets
would kill over 100 million people in each country on the first day. Just
two U.S. submarines, one in the Pacific and one in the Mediterranean,
could, with 320 H-bombs in all, wipe out most major Soviet cities.
Adding to current levels of nuclear weapons would not change the

military balance. As Admiral Noel Gayler (U.S. Navy, Ret.) puts it, the targeting decisions and which way the wind is blowing "make a greater difference than a thousand extra missiles on either side." Even today's nuclear "minor leaguers"—Great Britain, France and China—could kill as many Soviets in a day as died during four years of World War II. And all three of those countries point their nuclear weapons at the USSR.

Survivors would face an unprecedented situation. They would be surrounded by the dead and the dying, without adequate medical care or sanitary facilities, probably without a safe supply of food and water. The ozone layer of the earth's atmosphere that shields us from the sun's ultra-violet rays would be punctured. A massive increase in skin cancers would result, and animals and humans could be blinded by the sun. Plants would die and crops would fail, bringing on widespread famine. These changes would affect chiefly the northern hemisphere but, to a lesser extent, the southern hemisphere as well. In such a situation, the notion of superiority loses all meaning.

Nonetheless there are those who maintain that the Soviets, because they have heavy missiles of great accuracy, could attack our ICBMs in their silos without risk of retaliation by the United States. According to this reasoning, no American president would strike back because that would invite yet another Soviet attack—this time against American cities. But what if the Soviet leaders miscalculated? What if, in the face of monstrous losses, the American president refused to sit by without punishing the Soviets with submarine-launched missiles? No one has ever explained what possible political gain could induce the Soviets to risk the loss of their country in one throw of the nuclear dice.

No illusions

The Soviet leaders have no illusions about the effects of nuclear war. Leonid Brezhnev said: "Anyone who starts a nuclear war in the hope of winning it has thereby decided to commit suicide." The chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, has written that "in terms of the ferocity and the scale of potential destruction it (nuclear war) could be compared with no wars of the past. The very nature of modern weapons is such that, if they are put into play, the future of all mankind could be at stake." And the USSR pledged at the Second UN Special Session on Disarmament it would not use a nuclear weapon first in any war.

Some critics dismiss such statements. They believe the Soviet leaders would try to fight and "win" a nuclear war, pointing to the Soviet

civil defense program as proof of preparation for nuclear war-fighting. These critics overlook the import of several U.S. government reports on Soviet civil defense.

A 1978 study by the CIA concluded that the Soviets "cannot have confidence . . . in the degree of protection their civil defense would afford them, given the many uncertainties. . . . We do not believe that the Soviets' present civil defenses would embolden them deliberately to expose the USSR to a higher level of nuclear attack." The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency estimated in 1978 that, if U.S. nuclear bombs were exploded at ground level in a war, 70-85 million Soviet citizens would be killed "even if the Soviet evacuation and sheltering plan is fully implemented." Soviet citizens themselves mock their government's evacuation plans.

Dimitri K. Simes, a Soviet specialist who emigrated from the USSR, comments: "The abundant Soviet military literature proves beyond doubt that should nuclear war look imminent, Moscow may be prepared to launch on warning and to make every effort to reduce its own losses and to inflict the greatest possible damage on the enemy. What these writings do *not* indicate is any realistic expectation that the Soviet Union will be able to achieve anything approaching a significant victory—significant in the sense of accomplishing any vital political objectives."

Conventional forces

In conventional (non-nuclear) forces, the steady build-up has permitted the Soviets to strengthen the Warsaw Pact armies in Europe, move a third of their forces to China's flanks, and spread sophisticated weapons and advisors to many hot spots on the globe. A number of observers believe the Soviets have a significant advantage in conventional forces. On the other hand, four former top U.S. officials (McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan, Robert McNamara and Gerard Smith) state, "There has been some tendency, over many years, to exaggerate the relative conventional strength of the USSR and to underestimate the enormous costs and risks of any form of aggression against NATO. Today, there is literally no one who really knows what would be needed."

A similar view was expressed by the respected International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Reporting on Europe in the fall of 1981, it concluded that "the overall balance continues to be such as to make military aggression a highly risky undertaking. . . . The consequences for an attacker would be unpredictable, and the risks, particularly of

No one has ever explained what possible political gain could induce the Soviets to risk the loss of their country in one throw of the nuclear dice.

nuclear escalation, incalculable." At the same time, IISS observed that the numerical balance over the past 20 years has shifted toward the Warsaw Pact while NATO has largely lost its technological edge.

The essential point remains: a conventional war in Europe—or elsewhere—would probably escalate as the losing side turned to battlefield nuclear weapons. The consequences would then indeed be incalculable.

Aside from military manpower, where, according to IISS, the two sides are nearly equal, NATO and the Warsaw Pact have different strengths in conventional arms. The Warsaw Pact has an edge in tanks in Europe, but NATO leads in anti-tank weapons. NATO worries about the quantity and modernization of Soviet artillery and combat aircraft. In troop quality, however, U.S. commanders rate theirs above the Soviets'. Despite problems of alcohol and drug abuse in the U.S. forces, former Red Army soldiers report much more serious problems within Soviet ranks: rampant alcoholism, abuse of Central Asian troops by ethnic Russians, and a brutal two-caste system in which veterans severely mistreat recruits.

Some Americans see proof of the Soviets' global intentions in the growth of their navy. Starting from a low base, it can now project power to all parts of the world. However, NATO today has more major surface ships and twice the tonnage of the Warsaw Pact. Many Soviet craft are small coastal vessels. Soviet naval construction "has decreased for more than a decade," according to the Defense Intelligence Agency; NATO now outproduces the Pact in ships.

The 13 U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups, reinforced by British and French heavy carriers, are vastly superior to the Soviets' two carriers. The U.S. Navy also have overwhelming superiority in amphibious forces. And Soviet ships, divided because of geography into four separate navies, can reach the high seas only through "choke points" dominated by Norway, Turkey and Japan—all U.S. allies.

What about the allies?

Overall, the Warsaw Pact forces appear roughly the equal of NATO. But a significant difference shows up in the dependability of allies. Despite sharp policy disagreements among independent-minded allies, there is little doubt that NATO members would fight to repel a Soviet attack on Western Europe. What about the Soviet allies? Would Poles, Hungarians and Romanians follow Soviet orders to march against the West? No one—including the Soviet commanders of the Warsaw Pact—can be sure.

A comparison of East-West military strength would not be complete without considering China. The USSR deploys about a third of its active military units to meet the Chinese threat, and China continues to view the Soviet Union as the main threat to its security. China has as many troops as the entire Warsaw Pact. Half of its ground forces are stationed along the Soviet and Mongolian borders. Moreover, China's nuclear-tipped missiles are mobile or concealed in hardened silos; some could survive a nuclear attack and retaliate against the USSR. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff say that China "indirectly contributes to U.S. global and regional security objectives," although the Chinese leaders recently have been criticising both superpowers equally.

Given China's geography and military power and the hostility between the two Communist giants, the Soviets face potential foes on two fronts.

In view of all these factors, the perception of Soviet military superiority is inaccurate. Their enormous military power, if used against the West, would invite the utter destruction of their homeland.



According to another widely accepted belief, the Soviets have been gaining influence throughout the world. How in fact have they fared since the late 1950s?

World maps of those days showed a huge red blob oozing over the land mass of Europe and Asia. A seemingly unified Communist bloc stretched from East Germany to North Korea and North Vietnam. Soviet influence extended to oil-rich Indonesia and Iraq. The Communist parties of Western Europe were the feared agents of Moscow. The USSR and China held themselves out as models of economic development to the emerging poor countries of the Third World. The Communist bloc seemed powerful, dynamic, on the march.

Since then, China has split with the USSR. Nothing compensates the Soviets for that shattering blow. Nor has it been the only Soviet loss on the world scene.

Cracks have appeared in Soviet control over Eastern Europe. Despite the Soviets' use of force to suppress moves for greater independence there, Romania conducts an independent foreign policy and Hungary has rejected the Soviet economy as a model. Yugoslavia and Albania remain outside Moscow's orbit. And Poland continues to be an explosive source of unrest.

In Western Europe, the Communist parties operate legally while their political strength declines. The Italian and Spanish Communist parties, flaunting their independence, have denounced the Soviet role in Poland.

In the Third World the USSR has lost the influence it once had in key nations and maintains influence chiefly in some of the poorest and least powerful lands. Soviet influence has ended in Indonesia and

declined in Iraq. India, which grew close to the Soviets in the seventies, has returned to its neutral stance.

Mixed picture in Africa

The Soviets have gained influence in Angola and Ethiopia but were expelled by Egypt, Guinea, Somalia and Sudan during the 1970s. Some so-called "Marxist" countries in Africa such as Mozambique and Congo have treaties of friendship with the Soviet Union. Yet Mozambique negotiates with U.S., European and Asian firms for joint ventures in agriculture, fishing, manufacturing and mining, while poverty-stricken Congo isn't much of an asset for the USSR.

In the Middle East the USSR has uneasy relations with erratic Libya and volatile Syria. Both countries have absorbed lots of Soviet arms but

Cracks have appeared in Soviet control over Eastern Europe.

little Soviet advice. The Syrians and Soviets are openly contemptuous of one another. South Yemen, repeatedly called a "Soviet surrogate" by former Secretary of State Haig, is strategically located but also is tiny, very poor, and hard for the Soviets to reach. The fact that the United States eased trade restrictions with Syria and South Yemen in 1982 suggests that official Washington is not totally persuaded that those countries are in the Communist camp.

The Soviets were doubly embarrassed by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon: the Israelis destroyed many of the Soviet weapons supplied to the Syrians, while the Soviets did nothing to prevent the military defeat of the PLO.

In Asia the Soviets have gained influence in Indo-China, thanks in part to the American refusal to normalize relations with Vietnam after the war, and Mongolia remains a Soviet puppet. Yet these are small gains compared to the Soviet losses in China and Indonesia.

Only in Cuba does the Soviet Union have an ally whose political and military role in the Third World clearly serves Soviet interests. Cuban troops and teachers in Africa and Latin America help the Soviets

extend their reach. The cost to Moscow has been high: a continuing and expensive subsidy to a regime that has not always followed orders.

On balance, Soviet influence has somewhat diminished since the late 1950s. While the Soviets have a bigger military today and can project their power farther from their borders, their friends tend to look like a pick-up team that's too poor to bring its own equipment to the ballgame. The USSR has no big-power allies. It can't offer the little powers anything but guns and tanks. The world knows the Soviet economy is ailing, in no shape to aid development abroad.

Mutual loss of influence

What has really happened on the world scene in the past generation is that *both* superpowers have lost influence. New power centers have emerged. Many new nations have won their independence. Some of them have received advanced weaponry, giving them more confidence to rebuff superpower pressures. The United States can no longer roll up automatic majorities at the UN or be sure its allies will follow its lead. U.S. outposts in South Vietnam and Iran have been lost. These changes were fostered in part by U.S. policies—reviving Europe and Japan after World War II and supporting, not always consistently, the independence of former colonies.

In making judgments it's important to see through the labels that governments pin on themselves and others. Nowhere is that more necessary than in Africa. David Rockefeller, the retired chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank, has said, "The more I've seen of countries that are allegedly Marxist in Africa, the more I have a feeling it is more labels and trappings than reality."

Ex-Secretary Haig has expressed similar views. "In Africa," he has noted, "the evolution of revolution does require greater sensitivity. Don't believe the labels. Don't accept that once a Marxist-Leninist always a Marxist-Leninist." He later added, "Many countries with direct experience of the Soviet embrace are quietly attempting to broaden their relations."

Is this a master plan?

Yet those who insist the USSR is expanding its influence often claim that the Soviets have a "master plan" to take over the world. Adolf Hitler did have a master plan for Nazi Germany, spelled out in his book *Mein Kampf*. Some people believe that, deep in the bowels of the Kremlin, there must be a Soviet *Mein Kampf*.


If it exists, the Soviets are implementing it in a strange way. Would a "master plan" call for alienating the United States, China and Japan simultaneously? For losing influence over Yugoslavia and the West European Communist parties? Trading influence in Indonesia and Egypt for Angola and Ethiopia? Did the Soviets plan to back a losing faction in Zimbabwe? Did they improve their relations with the right-wing military dictatorship of Argentina in order to plant left-wing regimes in Latin America?

To ask these questions is to answer them. Rather than following some well-defined global strategy, the Soviets appear to be improvising. They are ready to exploit conflicts and back rebel forces against unpopular rightist governments and colonial regimes. Their support does not guarantee success, however, and where more than one faction is involved, the Soviets don't always pick the winner.

Nor is the direction of their foreign relations ideologically very consistent. Originally the Soviets backed the more conservative government of Somalia against radical Ethiopia. Then they started to switch sides and the Somalis asked them to leave. Moscow's relationship with the Argentine rightists is based on the Soviet need for grain, just as the ties with Colonel Qaddafi are based on Libya's ability to pay for arms with oil money.

On the surface, the invasion of Afghanistan seems to be a clearer case of planned expansionism—the first use of the Red Army outside of Eastern Europe. Was this really a move toward the Persian Gulf oil fields? A glance at the map shows more direct routes than through the Afghan mountains, if the Soviets were prepared to risk World War III. Their true purpose, more likely, was to save a crumbling pro-Moscow regime. At the time, they had no international incentive to show restraint since relations with the United States had already turned sour.

The Soviets may feel more confident than in the past because they think the West is relatively weaker. But Georgi Arbatov, the top Soviet expert on the United States, was probably being frank when he told journalist Joseph Kraft in 1978, "I can promise you, we don't feel like winners."



"An elephant afraid of mice" was how a former Reuters correspondent in Moscow once described the Soviet leadership. It is hard for Americans to realize that men as powerful as the Soviet leaders can also be so fearful. Yet history, geography, ideology and their political system itself have combined to give them a sense of insecurity. Their outlook has been molded by invasions, wars, the need to defend a vast territory, the power of the non-Communist nations, and political beliefs that emphasize "us vs. them" thinking. Growing military strength and slowly improving living standards have only recently made the Soviets more confident.

Despite this mounting confidence, 65 years after the Bolshevik Revolution Soviet leaders still fear the "corrupting" influence of rock music, blue jeans, religious postcards, unapproved books, dissidents and foreigners. Never having been exposed to real electoral risks or the free marketplace of ideas, they are afraid their control at home will unravel. To guard against that, they censor the media, restrict religious practices, persecute dissidents and crack down on wayward youths and artists. They see human rights inside the USSR as a challenge to their control.

If this fear seems excessive to us, and of their own making, other fears are rooted in reality—fear of war, of encirclement, and of China. These fears the leaders share with ordinary citizens.

Monuments to the dead of World War II dot the Soviet landscape. The memory of those 20 million, however, hardly needs monuments, flowers or government propaganda to keep it alive. Virtually every Soviet family lost someone in that war, and the memory is carried like a scar to this day. That experience, which the entire aging leader-

"An elephant afraid of mice" was how a former Reuters correspondent in Moscow once described the Soviet leadership.

ship shared, has created a deep national fear of another war. When relations with the United States worsened in the late 1970s, visitors found many Soviets suspecting that we were about to make war against them.

Fear of encirclement

In addition to war, the Soviets fear encirclement. The USSR, after all, is surrounded by hostile Communist nations—China and the restive members of the Warsaw Pact. The East European countries are not traditional allies of the Soviet Union. In the past they have often been enemies. Some of them fought with the Germans against the USSR in World War II.


History has taught the inhabitants of the Soviet Union that they live in a hostile world. Over the centuries their land has been invaded by Mongols, Turks, Swedes, Poles and Germans. In 1918 Great Britain, France, Japan and the United States sent troops to the Soviet state in an effort to suppress the Bolshevik Revolution in its infancy. Many American textbooks gloss over this. Yet it is one of the factors, within the living memory of older citizens, that makes the Soviets fearful of encirclement. Even today the Soviets see few friendly neighbors along thousands of miles of border. Democratic, neutral Finland is a rare exception. Beyond their immediate neighbors, the Soviets see a nuclear-armed NATO spanning two continents and a Third World that has rejected as often as it has accepted close relations. For the Soviets it is not a reassuring picture.

Finally there is a deep and longstanding fear of the Chinese, mainly on the part of ethnic Russians. This is due in part to the Russians' frequently racist attitude toward non-whites. It also reflects a special dislike for the Chinese, whom the Russians stereotype as cunning.

These feelings have been sharpened by the split between the two Communist giants. As allies they quarreled over borders, the extent of Soviet aid, the Soviets' heavyhanded treatment of the Chinese, and

whether Khrushchev or Mao would be the senior leader of the Communist world. After the split, the Soviets felt betrayed; they had provided aid to the Chinese revolutionaries only to be emphatically rejected.

Today the Soviets continue to feel the pressure of a billion Chinese on their border. China has nuclear weapons and an informal strategic relationship with the United States. Says Seweryn Bialer of Columbia University: "A hostile China allied with the United States, supported economically and perhaps militarily, could only be termed a hideous nightmare." The Soviet government, starting before Brezhnev's death and continuing under Yuri Andropov, has begun to talk of patching up relations with China. But it would take years, even with good will on both sides. For the present, there is no indication the Soviets would pay the price the Chinese would probably demand.



The Soviet Union, whose strengths have been stressed so long to the American public, is beset with weaknesses. These weaknesses, economic, social, ethnic and political, impose limits on the Soviets' international actions.

Despite rich natural resources, the Soviet economy is in poor shape. George Feifer, an observer who has been visiting the USSR since the 1950s, found Soviet citizens describing the economy as "falling apart" or "catastrophic." While it has gradually raised traditionally low living standards, especially in the Brezhnev era, the Soviet economy has been handicapped by gross mismanagement, a bloated civil service and priority for military production. The result has been shortages of capital and consumer goods.

Agriculture tops the list of economic problems. A confidential study prepared for the Soviet leadership, leaked to *The Washington Post* in 1982, revealed huge crop losses due to negligence and mismanagement. While the Soviets have increased food imports tenfold over the past decade, according to the study, they have been losing one-fifth of the grain harvest because it is harvested late or left to rot. A quarter of the beet crop and at least one-third of the potato crop are also left to rot.

Instead of building farm-to-market roads, the Soviets have concentrated on massive dams and drainage programs. As a result, farmers are often isolated by mud for several months a year. And instead of providing smaller, more numerous grain elevators and barns, the Soviets have constructed huge warehouses in remote locations.

Food is becoming a political problem. The Soviet people aren't hungry, but the government must deal with rising expectations. Long

lines at food stores lacking variety and quality have triggered widespread public complaints. The Soviets buy grain and beef with money they get mostly from exports of oil and gold. Lately the world price of these two products has been falling.

The picture in industry is mixed. The steel industry continues to outproduce the United States; it produced less in 1981, however, than in 1978. Computers are rare, high technology almost nonexistent, and the civilian electronics industry lags behind other industrialized countries. Overall, the growth of the Soviet economy has slowed considerably, although the rate of growth remains slightly ahead of the United States.

The vodka epidemic

George Feifer found productivity "fantastically low." Alcoholism, now at epidemic proportions and spreading to women and children, is the main cause. Soviet workers drink an average of 38 quarts of vodka a year. They are often drunk on the job or don't show up at all. Because of alcoholism, life expectancy is dropping in the Soviet Union, alone among modern countries.

There is a massive black market, and extensive bartering goes on, often of state-owned materials. One factory worker told Feifer, "We all work terribly, all cheat and steal. Because the pay's just too little now to buy proper food. People laugh at anyone who's straight. I don't mean stealing from people, of course, but from the factory, the state." This denial of civic morality seems to reflect not only economic pressures but also an emptiness in people's lives. The gap between Soviet propaganda and Soviet everyday life is wide, and many citizens appear to have abandoned all sense of civic responsibility in pursuit of their private interests.

Soviet youth seems to feel the gap most acutely. The lyrics of Time Machine, the most popular rock music group in the USSR, express aimlessness and disillusionment. "I do not believe in promises," one of its songs goes, "and will not do so in the future. There is no point in believing in promises any longer." The Young Communist League's official newspaper has attacked Time Machine as "un-Russian" for spreading subversive ideas, cynicism, and pessimism.


If cynicism is a problem among Soviet young people, one of the causes is the emergence of a privileged class with inherited advantages. The children of Communist Party leaders are assured the best education and the top jobs. They benefit from their parents' access to special stores, summer homes and the right to travel abroad. The top

Soviet military has also become "a privileged and self-perpetuating class," according to Dimitri Simes.

In addition to class divisions, there are ethnic divisions in the Soviet Union. While the ethnic Russian population is growing slowly, the Central Asian population has been doubling every 30 years. By the end of the 1980s, one-third of all military recruits will be Muslims. In view of the tensions mentioned earlier, this is likely to have an impact on the Soviet military. Such tensions are not limited to the armed forces. They are part of the broader Soviet society, where Russians consider Central Asians inferior. In turn, the numerous minorities in the Soviet Union resent political domination by the Russians, who hold the command positions.

The lyrics of Time Machine, the most popular rock music group in the USSR, express aimlessness and disillusionment.

The Soviet political system keeps such tensions under strict control. Despite this control by the government and the Communist Party, Soviet citizens do complain about domestic conditions. Yet these same citizens close ranks with their government on foreign policy. They are deeply patriotic, they assume their government is protecting them from foreign threats, and they lack independent sources of information on international issues. On the whole, there is little evidence that most Soviet people resent the one-party dictatorship under which they live. Most of the population is apolitical and tends to accept authoritarian rule.



The foreign policy goals of the Soviet leaders reflect a mix of their insecurities and their desire for status and influence. These goals include: controlling the countries in the Soviet bloc, gaining worldwide standing as a superpower, splitting the United States from its allies, and expanding their own influence without risking war.

The Soviets see the satellite states of Eastern Europe as the core of their security and have demonstrated that they will use force, whether direct or indirect, to maintain control there. From the end of World War II until 1979, Eastern Europe was the only place to which Soviet combat troops were sent. The invasion of Afghanistan demonstrated that Moscow will not allow any Soviet-dominated neighbor to go non-Communist if it can prevent it.

Yet the Soviets have not automatically intervened everywhere in their bloc. They have reconciled themselves to economic reforms in Hungary, and an independent Catholic Church in Poland. They never seriously threatened Romania, despite its criticism of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and its generally independent foreign policy. And the Soviets stood by when Yugoslavia and Albania left their camp.

Superpower status looms large in Soviet eyes. On a par with the United States militarily and second only to it in industrial production, the Soviets crave the international recognition they consider their right and the privileges that go with superpower status. As their foreign minister put it, there "should be no international question of any significance which could be decided without the Soviet Union or in opposition to it." They reacted bitterly when the United States excluded them from the Middle East peacemaking process and when the United

Soviet leaders see no contradiction between their desire to be treated as an equal by the United States and their efforts to divide the United States from its allies.

States apparently went back on a deal to extend them "most favored nation status" on trade in return for Jewish emigration.

Soviet leaders see no contradiction between their desire to be treated as an equal by the United States and their efforts to divide the United States from its allies. Moscow has exploited U.S.-European differences on both military and economic policy. Playing on European fears that central Europe may become a nuclear battlefield, the Soviets have mounted major campaigns against the introduction of intermediate-range missiles and the neutron bomb. The USSR has more than anti-American propaganda in mind, however; Pershing missiles in Europe could reach Soviet soil in 6-8 minutes.

Pipeline pressures

The dispute over the planned natural gas pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe offered the Soviets a golden opportunity to exploit differences within the Western alliance. The Reagan administration publicly justified its trade sanctions on pipeline equipment as a penalty against Soviet repression in Poland. The administration also feared greater West European dependence on the USSR and wanted to squeeze the Soviets economically, not help them win a hard currency market for their gas.

Western Europe, on the other hand, strongly favors the project because it provides jobs in a period of high unemployment and assures increasing energy supplies in the future. The West Europeans say the pipeline will help them diversify their energy sources, making them more independent. In the end, the United States had to back down under West European pressure and drop the sanctions or risk a major split in the alliance.

In recent years the Third World has been the focus of Soviet efforts to extend their influence. In most cases the cost has been low: modest military aid, advisors, covert action, and treaties of friendship. They supplied military equipment lavishly, however, in the Vietnam war and

in several stages of the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict.

While exploiting conflicts in various parts of the world the USSR has generally been careful to avoid confronting the United States directly. The Kremlin does not see its military adventures in the Third World as a direct challenge to the United States and indeed seemed surprised by the U.S. reaction to Angola and Afghanistan. As the Soviets see it, the United States behaves the same way but the Soviet Union does not react angrily. This difference of view remains a major potential source of conflict between the superpowers.



The U.S. government has expressed opposition to Soviet military interventions and has enjoyed broad public support for this position. Yet large segments of the public have accepted U.S. military interventions in foreign countries. That reveals a double standard. In judging international behavior or any other, fairness requires a single standard.

It is not enough that the United States is a democracy and the USSR is a dictatorship. We have to know the particulars of a foreign intervention. What are the stated and the real purposes? The effects? How does it feel to the people on the receiving end?

The shoe-on-the-other-foot approach is useful here. That means we ask ourselves, when judging a U.S. action, how would we react if the Soviets were behaving in the same way? And vice versa.

With that caution, let us compare the U.S. and Soviet records on direct military intervention, the use of proxy forces, and undercover operations.

As we have seen earlier, the Soviets intervened militarily in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. In all three cases the Soviets feared the regimes they dominated were about to slip out of their grasp. They sometimes pretended to be invited in by their "allies." The hollowness of this claim was best illustrated in Afghanistan where the arriving Soviets executed the Afghan leader they said had requested the intervention. We know what has been happening since.

Apart from Korea, which was a special case, the United States has intervened militarily three times since the end of World War II. It sent troops to Lebanon in 1958 and to the Dominican Republic in 1965; starting in 1961 it sent military advisors and later combat soldiers to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Lebanon and the Dominican Republic

were fleeting interventions. The one in Indo-China was long, costly and bitter.

Ignorant of Vietnamese history and political and social realities, successive American administrations tried to prevent a Communist movement from taking power despite that movement's success in ending French colonial rule. The United States backed a faction weakened by corruption against another faction strengthened by its nationalist victories in 1954. Reunification of Vietnam by the Communists would no doubt have been the result of elections scheduled for 1956, had the Eisenhower administration not helped block them. The outcome would have been less bloody.

Both the United States and the USSR have tried to change other governments by use of proxy forces, the Soviets more recently and more often. The United States trained, equipped and transported Cuban exiles in 1961 to overthrow Castro's regime. The Soviets equipped and transported Cuban troops to Angola and Ethiopia in the 1970s. These troops continue to prop up the regimes in both countries.

Covert operations

The two superpowers have used covert operations to influence the politics of other countries, some of which we may never know about. The Soviets have secretly trained agents, funneled money to political groups and movements, and subsidized publishing ventures in various parts of the world. For years they have used local Communist parties as their agents abroad.

The United States has successfully overthrown Third-World governments through undercover activities. In 1953 the CIA helped oust a mildly leftist government in Iran. The following year the CIA played a major role in the revolt against a reformist government in Guatemala. The Senate committee that investigated the CIA's activities in Chile reported, "In 1970, the CIA attempted to foment a military takeover to prevent (Salvador) Allende from taking office after his election." Later, the committee added, the United States "adopted a policy of opposition to Allende and the U.S. government remained in intelligence contact with the Chilean military, including officers who were participating in coup plotting." CIA involvement in a series of attempts on Fidel Castro's life has been widely reported in the media.

Thus both superpowers have meddled near their own borders and far beyond their spheres of influence in attempts to transform the political scene. The Soviets, as noted earlier, were out to keep Soviet bloc countries under their control and to expand their influence in

Africa and elsewhere at what they judged low risk. The U.S. government took on the role of global policeman, trying to undermine any government or movement seen as representing "international Communism." Both nations assumed the right to shape the political life of other people, by force if necessary. In short, both acted like superpowers.

There are those who find a basic difference between U.S. and Soviet interventions: "successful" U.S. interventions permit people to preserve or regain their freedom while Soviet interventions lock people into a life under dictatorship. Does the record bear out this distinction?

The Iranian and Guatemalan governments overturned with CIA aid in the 1950s were replaced by brutal, corrupt right-wing dictatorships that lasted for decades. The violent Soviet suppression of the

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1956 revolt in Hungary was followed by a gradual relaxation of controls over Hungarian citizens and the economy. On the other hand, Soviet invasions left behind a limp puppet state in Czechoslovakia and bloodshed and turmoil in Afghanistan, while the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic permitted the evolution of a democratic system.

U.S. and Soviet military interventions and covert activities are not so different as we would like to think. There is no call for self-righteousness on our part. Intervention cannot be justified as a means of directing or blocking internal change in other countries.



Competition between the superpowers for worldwide influence is likely to go on for years to come. But even as they compete, the two nations have a common stake in avoiding war, in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, and in reducing the crippling costs of the arms race. These mutual interests are the basis for agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Their common interest in avoiding war is obvious. In a conventional war the losing side would be likely to use nuclear weapons. Nuclear war would destroy both sides as living societies. There is no evidence that Soviet leaders or citizens fail to appreciate the perils of a nuclear war. Since the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviets have avoided confrontations that could escalate into war with the United States. That danger has also made them wary of an uncontrolled arms race. This recognition of the risks gives them a basic incentive to reach arms agreements with the United States—the same incentive we have.

It is generally thought that proliferation of nuclear weapons threatens both superpowers and other countries as well. The more fingers on the nuclear trigger, the greater the chances of nuclear war, whether by accident, miscalculation or design. The Nuclear Club at present consists of the United States, the USSR, Great Britain, France and China. Israel and South Africa are believed to have secret stocks of nuclear weapons. India has tested a nuclear "device" and neighboring Pakistan is developing nuclear weapons, probably with funds from Libya. Colonel Qaddafi is expected to share in Pakistan's bomb output. The Israelis destroyed Iraq's nuclear reactor on the grounds that it was meant to make material for bombs. Other countries with the knowl-

But even as they compete, the two nations have a common stake in avoiding war . . .

edge and perhaps the desire to make their own nuclear weapons in the not-too-distant future are Argentina, Brazil, South Korea and Taiwan.

Such broad access to nuclear weapons raises the possibility of a war that might eventually draw in the superpowers. It is conceivable that India and Pakistan or Israel and Libya could, in this century, become involved in a nuclear war. Would the USSR and the United States react? Might a small-scale, yet frightful, nuclear war escalate into a superpower confrontation?

The United States and the Soviet Union have a clear interest in avoiding such a situation. They might have a better chance of avoiding it if they cut back their own strategic arms, as they in fact pledged to do when they signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. That pledge was part of a bargain with the nuclear "have-nots." These countries agreed not to acquire nuclear weapons in return for arms reduction by the nations already possessing them. So long as the superpowers keep adding to their nuclear arsenals, they cannot persuade others to stay out of the Nuclear Club.

Economic burdens

Finally, the superpowers have a common interest in reducing the economic burden of the arms race. Neither side can meet its domestic needs unless it reduces military spending.

The Reagan administration has proposed a \$1.6 trillion military budget over five years. This record peacetime build-up comes in a period of economic recession, inflation and high budget deficits. Although experts disagree about the effects on the economy, many believe that a steep increase in military spending will tend to keep deficits and interest rates high, stimulate inflation, and divert skilled workers and raw materials from the civilian sector. At a time when American industry is suffering from foreign competition, these side effects of the military build-up could add to our economic woes.

For the USSR, with an economy half the size of ours and military spending slightly higher than ours, the burden is all the heavier. It has

already made a dent in Soviet living standards. The leadership has shown for years that it will squeeze its people economically to keep pace with the United States. While the Soviets probably cannot be pushed into bankruptcy by military spending, neither can they assure decent living standards to their people if they continue the arms race.

Agreements that could lessen the danger of war, halt the spread of nuclear weapons and reduce arms spending must be based on these common interests, not on trust. Trust between the superpowers may develop over time, as agreements bring tangible benefits to both parties. But for the present, there is no substitute for tough bargaining and precise, verifiable treaties.



Once they've signed a treaty, don't the Soviets cheat? Let us examine that frequently heard charge.

First, some background. The United States and the USSR have reached a number of agreements limiting nuclear arms. Among the most important are the Limited Nuclear Test Ban (1963), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1970), and SALT I (1972).

Nuclear arms treaties are all verified by spy satellites, radars and other electronic devices operated independently by each country. This verification by advanced technology assures each side, with reasonable confidence, that the other isn't cheating. The Standing Consultative Commission set up by SALT I investigates complaints about compliance with that agreement from either side.

In negotiations to end underground nuclear tests—negotiations which have not led to ratified treaties—the Soviets have even agreed to placement of tamper-proof instruments on, and visits by outside inspectors to, their territory. For that closed society this was a big step to take.

A State Department report in 1979 revealed that both countries had raised questions about the other's compliance with the terms of SALT I. The Soviets, for example, had raised questions about possible U.S. concealment of U.S. missile silos. In every case, the questionable activity came to an end or was found not to conflict with the treaty's terms. Some of the questions raised by the American side were based on U.S. statements never agreed to by the Soviets. In other words, the treaty left grey areas with room for argument. The Soviets interpreted these to their own advantage. Nonetheless, the report showed no

actual violations by either side. Nor have the Soviets violated other treaties dealing with nuclear weapons.

The Soviet record on chemical and biological warfare is murkier. The United States has accused the USSR of using lethal gases in Afghanistan and of involvement in the use of chemical and biological weapons in Southeast Asia. This is the "yellow rain" described by tribesmen in Laos and Kampuchea (Cambodia).

If the Soviets have done what is charged, they have violated the Chemical Protocol of 1925 and the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972. The Soviets deny all knowledge of any violations. As of this writing, independent evidence is hard to obtain and specialists are following the situation. Neither of the treaties in question, unfortunately, provided for verification.

The Soviets have respected the nuclear-arms agreements—which have been verified by U.S. technology—although they pushed to the allowed limits on SALT I.

Agreements that endorse general principles but fail to define terms and spell out implementation do not bind the USSR adequately. The Yalta accord on free elections in Eastern Europe is one example. More recent cases are the 1972 agreement in which the superpowers pledged not to take advantage of each other and the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The 1972 agreement did not stop the Soviets in Angola; the Helsinki Accords did not keep them from cracking down on dissidents.

A clear verdict of cheating, however, cannot be reached. The Soviets have respected the nuclear-arms agreements—which have been verified by U.S. technology—although they pushed to the allowed limits on SALT I. They may have violated bans against chemical and biological warfare, but the jury is still out on that. Vague agreements are grist for the Soviet mill. The Soviets keep agreements when it is in their interest to do so, when the provisions are specific, and when other parties are in a position to know whether or not the terms are being respected.



Conclusion

Back to the problem posed at the outset: How do you reach agreements with people you think are out to do you in?

First, we have to question the assumption about Soviet intentions, then consider Soviet capabilities.

Soviet leaders no doubt would like to eclipse the United States in influence over the long haul, but they are not prepared to commit national suicide. They have usually been cautious about situations that might lead to war with the United States. They see the long-term struggle for influence as just that: a struggle, waged with political, psychological, economic and military means. In that struggle, the Soviets sometimes engage in offensive but essentially minor actions that we should not mistake for assaults on our national security. Americans can afford to take a confident view of change in the world.

The Soviets, like the United States, are subject to the limits of power. They are a superpower only militarily, with tattered political and economic appeal. They possess no magic to persuade people in Europe or the Third World that their way represents the wave of the future. The USSR's internal problems and heavy-handed or brutal ways of dealing with weaker countries undercut Soviet influence. Even their enormous military strength is of use to them only when there is no danger of retaliation by the West.

Soviet leaders know they cannot destroy the United States without risking the destruction of their own homeland. They know that while the West is divided on many issues, the Soviet camp is weakened by rebellion in Afghanistan and sullen resentment in Eastern Europe. Far from choosing a collision course with the United States, the Soviet

leadership seems to be looking for deals between the superpowers. That is why we can reach agreements with them in areas of common interest.

Two-track approach

The situation calls for a continuing two-track approach to U.S.-Soviet relations: cooperating in areas of common interest and competing for influence in other areas. Even the competition, however, has to be kept in check so that it is less likely to lead to crisis.

A two-track approach is not a new idea. Richard Nixon signed SALT I while U.S. bombers were striking Soviet ships in North Vietnamese ports. Ronald Reagan began strategic arms talks with the

"We and the Soviets are like Siamese twins. We may have two heads and think differently, but our mutual self-interests are overwhelming."

Soviets just a few weeks after proposing a worldwide "test of will and ideas" with the people he had called "liars" and "cheats."

U.S.-Soviet cooperation must be based primarily on the common need to end the arms race. Mutual arms reduction and other measures to prevent nuclear war have to stay at the top of the agenda, regardless of what we think of the Soviet system and without waiting for that system to reform.

Yet agreements on arms, crucial as they are, may not be enough. Confrontations between the superpowers often grow out of conflicts arising among other nations. More attention must be paid to resolving such conflicts before they embroil outsiders and become international tests of will.

This in turn presents some difficult choices for Americans. Is it safer to isolate the Soviets or to risk bringing them—and their views and interests—into negotiations? Would it be more dangerous to involve the Soviets in the peacemaking process in such explosive regions as the Middle East, or to keep them outside where they could aggravate the problem? What would be the effect on world politics in

either case? At some point soon a national dialogue on these questions might prove more valuable than the current anti-Soviet campaign Washington is waging.

That campaign assumes the U.S.-Soviet conflict is permanent, with the Soviet Union incapable of change—unless it crumbles under American pressure. The USSR is unlikely to crumble, however, and a U.S. approach that emphasizes implacable hostility is more likely to raise hackles than yield solutions. The long-term U.S. interest lies in managing the competitive relationship with the Soviets in such a way as to encourage greater cooperation in the decades ahead.

Meanwhile, even as Americans build ever more H-bombs aimed at the Soviet Union, we ship the Soviets more food than has ever moved between two nations. Dorann Gunderson, Republican chair of the Women's Campaign Fund, expressed the irony of this situation: "It's not logical," he said. "We and the Soviets are like Siamese twins. We may have two heads and think differently, but our mutual self-interests are overwhelming."

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Questions for Discussion

1. Which Soviet actions seem to have caused the strongest distrust among the American public?
2. Which claims of Soviet strength seem the most exaggerated?
3. How would you describe the military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact?
4. What is the state of relations between China and the USSR?
5. Do you think that the Soviet leaders would try to fight and "win" a nuclear war?
6. What are some of the Soviets' major weaknesses?
7. Do the Soviet leaders believe they can dominate the world one day?
8. How would you compare U.S. and Soviet efforts to intervene in other countries?
9. What are the common interests of the United States and the Soviet Union?
10. How would you judge Soviet compliance with international treaties?
11. What should be the long-term U.S. approach to the Soviet Union?

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